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Abstract
This paper examines the threats to Indigenous water rights and territories in the Andean countries. It analyzes
how water and water rights are embedded in Indigenous territories, and how powerful actors and intervention
projects tend to undermine local societies and indigenous livelihoods by developing large-scale water
infrastructure. Three cases illustrate the encroachment process. In Colombia, the Embera Katio people’s water
territory is colonized by a large-scale hydropower development project. In Ecuador, large-scale drinking water
development for megacities aims the water belonging to the Oyacachi community’s indigenous highland
territory. In Peru, communal water rights of the Colca Valley indigenous peasantry are under threat because of
large-scale irrigation development. As the cases show, Indigenous peoples and communities actively contest
the undermining and subordination of their water and territorial rights through a myriad of multi-scalar
livelihood defense strategies. The challenges that indigenous peoples face to defend their water-based
livelihoods are, however, enormous and growing every day.
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Contested Territories: Water Rights and the Struggles over Indigenous Livelihoods 
 
Water is essential to life, livelihoods, and cultural identities. In many places around the world water acquires 
additional importance for marginalized peasant communities and Indigenous peoples because they commonly 
have to sustain their livelihood and water security through subsistence economies that, in current processes of 
globalization, face extremely adverse physical and political conditions. For them, connections between water 
sources, people, places, production, and identity are crucial and profoundly relate to the particular ways of 
perceiving, creating, and re-creating “territory”. Dominant classes and cultures, however, tend to impose 
policies and qualifications on territories and water rights that fiercely clash with local cultures and territorial 
livelihood strategies (Gelles, 2002; Getches, 2012; Hinojosa, Chummacero, Cortez, Bebbington, & Humphrey 
Bebbington, 2012; Roth, Boelens, & Zwarteveen, 2005). The last decades have shown how water officialdom 
has embraced mainstream water science, officially endorsed as rational “water culture,” and policies built on 
universalistic recipes, but failed to consider existing water societies, identities, and practices that have been 
successful (Boelens & Vos, 2012; Vera, 2011a). 
 
The conflict between cultures, divergent economies, and sociopolitical structures in disputes over water rights 
is especially well illustrated in Latin America, for instance, in the highland and tropical rain forest 
communities of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. These countries vary in their professed respect 
for Indigenous and campesino cultures, but all have enacted water laws and pronounced policies that can 
abrade local cultures (Bebbington, Humphreys Bebbington, & Bury, 2012; Boelens, Cremers, & Zwarteveen, 
2011; Boelens, Getches, & Guevara, 2012; Hendriks, 2012). Despite the reality of multiple cultural identities 
and livelihood strategies, an array of stereotypes about the moral and economic features of peasant 
communities and Indigenous populations exists. These images have been influenced by racist impulses to 
discipline the Indians, as well as by motives emerging from progressive, humanistic ideals. Throughout 
history, paternalistic, apparently benign, attempts to “civilize” Indians by bringing them into the mainstream 
have been endemic to nation-states that have encountered different cultures and peoples within their borders 
(Assies & Gundermann, 2007; Baud, 2012). 
 
New water policies in Latin America would seem to offer more room for local Indigenous normative systems 
and water cultures. While water scarcity and competition for water resources are increasing (from Indigenous 
and peasant populations, mining, export-oriented agribusiness, the urban water supply sector, and other 
stakeholders), the idea that problems should be solved with less control from the top down and more local 
control and initiatives has spawned proposals for less “state-centered” policies. Still, these latest, especially 
market-oriented, models reflect a universalizing bias by offering blanket prescriptions for the vast diversity of 
local contexts (Boelens et al., 2012). Further, the approach of “normative decentralization” in water 
governance often has a privatizing, individualizing aim, clearly working against collective water management 
by rural and Indigenous communities (Achterhuis, Boelens, & Zwarteveen, 2012; Bakker, 2010). As observed 
by Assies (2012), the neoliberal model and its policies are not just economic, but include a cultural program 
which is a powerful tool to establish a particular, market-based relationship among the state, the market, and 
civil society stakeholders (cf. Foucault, 1991). Rather than establishing strategies or policies seeking collective 
action, new neoliberal policies create competition for water and foster speculation by current users and by 
new economic agents (Achterhuis et al., 2012). Water rights and water security frameworks in Andean 
countries’ highland communities and tropical rain forest Indigenous territories differ from privatized models 
by featuring collective, territorial water rights. As Getches (2012) argues, Indigenous peoples' ability to 
perform water-dependent vocations, such as farming, strategizing interconnected livelihood activities, 
perpetuating territorial cultures, and keeping alive spiritual practices, depends on achieving success in limiting 
the encroachment of incompatible political, economic, and legal practices embodied in the economic policies 
and water laws of host nations and transnational actors (Manosalvas, 2012; Roa-Avendaño & Duarte, 2011; 
cf. Vera, 2011a, 2011b). This challenge has been enormously difficult in most Latin American countries; as 
Barkin (2009) observes regarding the construction of mega-projects that reconstruct Indigenous territories, 
“the dams and massive floods are designed to remake topography in a gigantic effort to restructure the 
region’s economy and place it at the service of international capital. Little consideration is accorded to the 
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millions of people in communities that have tried to manage these ecosystems and protect their resources, 
while forging a society and economy that takes the biosphere’s needs into account” (p. 10).  
 
This paper analyzes the ways in which Indigenous water sources, water rights, and territories in the Andean 
countries are contested. The next section briefly examines how local water uses and rights are embedded in 
Indigenous territories and how the development of  large-scale water infrastructure projects by national 
policies and transnational interest groups threatens and even undermines local, water-based livelihoods of  
Indigenous communities. Section three presents three common, illustrative cases: the water territory of  the 
Embera Katio communities in Colombia is encroached on by a large-scale hydropower development project; 
the Indigenous highland territory of  the Ecuadorian Oyacachi community is invaded by a megacity drinking 
water development project; and the Indigenous peasant communities in the Colca Valley of  Peru are dried 
out by a large-scale agribusiness irrigation project. Section four examines the responses of  the Indigenous 
peoples and communities, in terms of  their strategies to defend themselves against these encroachment 
policies and practices. Section five presents the overall conclusions, locating the three countries’ experiences 
in the wider socio-political context of  Latin American power structures and water governance arenas. 
 
Indigenous Territories and Disputed Waters 
 
In the demands and struggles by rural and Indigenous peoples in Latin America, defending and recovering 
their territories is a central goal. Regarding the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO, 1989) Agreement 169 urges governments to recognize “ownership and 
possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy” (Article 14, item 1) and 
safeguard the right to use land to which they have traditionally had access for their livelihoods. Article 15 
(item 1) adds that, “these rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and 
conservation of these resources.” Such provisions, like others in various international agreements and 
conventions on Indigenous rights to water (for a broad overview see Getches, 2012), are a great step forward 
in defending territorial rights. Even so, in the Andean countries – in those few cases when governments pay 
any attention to the conventions that they have signed – it is common for them to attempt to limit application 
to a geographical-biophysical space with rigid boundaries, although the Indigenous peoples view a territory as 
a whole and not a sum of its parts. Therefore, in the eyes of these peoples, territories cannot be divided up or 
sectioned (Manosalvas, 2012; Roa-Avendaño, 2012). For Indigenous peoples, claims of territory include, on 
the one hand, taking control, use, enjoyment, and management of the natural resources in their territory and, 
on the other, being able to make decisions about political, economic, social, and cultural issues (Gelles, 2012; 
Roa-Avendaño & Duarte, 2011). 
 
An initial approach to the complex definition of  water territories involves those situations in which local 
peoples and communities take responsibility for managing their co-existence with society, nature, and 
agroecology around them sustainably, and struggle against control externalization. “This process implies the 
active construction and reconstruction of  ‘water territory’ as a socioproductive, cultural and political living 
space and ‘home-base’, as a rooted and multi-layered ‘political water community’, as a scheme of  mutual 
belonging that enables the rebirth of  collective imagination. Such water territories involve socio-natural webs 
with landscapes and waterscapes in which people live and make livelihoods and identities, for which people 
feel responsible, in which they are morally involved” (Boelens et al., 2012, p. 19).  
 
Obviously, local communities, immersed in unequal power relationships and globalizing contexts, do not 
always achieve such lasting management. Further, other external (and generally more powerful) stakeholders 
have their own definitions and constructs regarding the meaning of  “territory.” Roa-Avendaño & Duarte 
(2011) argue that, in political and economic practice, territories are configured through social and power 
relations, so that externally imposed spatial organization generates contradictions with local cultural referents 
and senses of  identity. These modern mindsets that define control over territory are often based on individual 
economic interests that are legitimized through concepts of  development and progress and ignore cultural 
diversity and Indigenous livelihoods. Therefore, not only stakeholders and entities, but also different 
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worldviews and political frameworks, face off  when the fundamental aim is to define, organize, and defend 
water territory (Hinojosa et al., 2012; cf. Manosalvas, 2012). 
 
To understand territorial and water rights according to local concepts, there are many elements that will be 
overlooked when applying an approach that is simply “functionalist and productivist”; for example, the right 
to water is located not only in technical, organizational, and economic settings, but also in political, cultural, 
and even ethical, religious, and epistemological domains (Boelens & Gelles, 2005). The rules, rights, and 
duties related to water are closely linked with cultural systems of meanings, symbols, and values. In many 
communities, control over, and distribution of, water are profoundly involved in both human and 
supernatural or spiritual institutions and relations; both are viewed as elements that influence and define 
control over water. Expressly or implicitly, supernatural authority often reinforces the legitimacy of a 
particular human authority and action; communities turn to symbolic and religious powers to control water 
and regulate families’ behavior, either unconsciously or with clearly practical purposes, for example, 
agroproductive or political aims (Boelens, 2009; Hinojosa et al., 2012; Roa-Avendaño, 2012; cf. Vera, 2011a)  
 
So, water control, use, and rights are embedded in historical and context-specific relationships determining 
the nature, value, and function of water, which ties them closely to the identity of the communities holding 
such rights. In this context, water, land, territory, and community form a whole that must be viewed in its 
entirety, without denying that each element also has its own specific features. Recognizing these 
interrelationships present a major challenge to bureaucratic and neoliberal policies that assume people put 
aside their social identities and relations for “rational, efficient water management.” For rural communities 
and Indigenous peoples, water is one of  many elements that inhabitants share, one part of  the multiple 
relations among them (Arroyo & Boelens, 1997; de Vos, Boelens, & Bustamante, 2006). 
 
Modernist water policies, training, and intervention programs, indeed, tend to portray such local views on 
water and territory as “traditional” (and not as dynamically constructed in current, globalizing times) and 
“backward.” They often have the implicit objective of  protecting local water user communities from their 
own perverse, backward identities and limited water cultures, supposedly freeing them from their inefficient, 
irrational water rights systems. It is commonly thought that legal training, schooling in expert-based frames of  
water rights and techniques, development of  water markets, and correction or formalization of  their 
informalities is required for those supposedly excluded from modernity to be included – through adequately 
adapting the inadequate, consciousness-raising among the unconscious, and capacity-building with the 
incapable (Boelens, 2009).  
 
As the following cases testify, water reforms and intervention programs, commonly presented as sets of  
neutral, scientifically objective government techniques to foster progress, have deeply social, political, and 
cultural consequences for existing Indigenous territories and water rights collectives (Achterhuis et al., 2012). 
They are attempting self-reproduction – crafting a water world after their own likeness (Boelens, 2009). 
Although they explicitly claim to promote respect for local territorial and water rights, most contemporary 
Latin-American nation states have promoted a form of  multiculturalism that actually destroys collective 
management of  water territories whenever the market’s rules of  play are not followed (Assies, 2012). With the 
latest neoliberal wave in the Andean countries, which is fostered by banks and international agencies and by 
states themselves, globalizing forces strengthen the market-based institutional models that threaten to co-opt 
local territorial systems and community management forms (Bakker, 2010; Hendriks, 2012; Perreault, 2008).  
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Illustrations in Cases from Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 
 
Colonization of  the Embera Katio People’s River Territory in Colombia 
 
The Embera Katio1 Indigenous territory has been subjected to successive waves of  pressure throughout 
history, disputing access to and control over the natural assets of  the Sinú River valley.2 Colonization to 
extract timber, appropriation of  land for agriculture, and intensive livestock raising have broken down this 
Indigenous people’s territorial structures. Further, penetration by, and confrontations among, armed groups 
have forced these communities to displace toward the outskirts of  municipal areas. 
 
Throughout these processes, the Inter-American Development Bank has generated study guidelines for 
integrated development of  the Sinú watershed to regulate and control the river to generate electricity, increase 
productivity, and develop land in the river valley. The Urrá hydropower development project was conceived 
starting in the mid-twentieth century, and, despite decades of  Indigenous protests, the Urrá S.A. 
Multipurpose Company began construction in 1993 during Columbia’s energy crisis. This occurred after the 
Institute of  Renewable Natural Resources (INDERENA – now the Ministry of  Environment) granted the 
environmental license to build a major reservoir 30 kilometers upriver from the Municipality of  Tierralta, 
Córdoba. Although the project would seriously affect the Embera Katio people, small communities of  
fishers, and Indigenous people in the lower Sinú basin, none of  them were consulted, despite Colombia’s 
1991 Constitution (and Law 21) that recognizes ethnic communities’ right to prior consultation and to taking 
part in decisions about projects or works affecting their territories. This Urrá I hydropower dam began 
operating in 2000, but its severe consequences, including the flooding of  7,400 hectares and displacement of  
communities, were visible long before.  
 
The Urrá Company took advantage of  the growing conflicts, outside pressures, and internal divisions among 
the Indigenous people to push through the approval license for new mega-hydraulic plans quickly (the Sinú 
project, also called Urrá II). The government did not take a neutral position or guarantee the customary rights 
proclaimed in the Constitution; instead, it supported the Company’s economic interests. The alliance between 
political power and geo-territorial interest groups, intimately linked to economic power, stood in the way of  
any genuine public involvement of  local communities. 
 
The Indigenous communities reject this new Urrá project because the mega-project will transform and 
fragment their territory and destroy the river and its aquatic wealth. Water has been fundamental in the 
Embera Katio culture, in economic, ecological, social, and cultural terms. In fact, for these Indigenous 
groups, the most important myth involves the origin of  water. In this myth, the Emberas’ main cultural hero, 
Karagabí, rescues the water from stingy people so all Emberas can enjoy it. The felling of  the large Jenené 
tree by Karagabí created all the rivers, wetlands, creeks, and lakes and compensated for the pettiness of  
Jenzerá, the ant who had accumulated and appropriated the water flows. The Embera Katío believe that 
water, like all of  nature, belongs to all people, so everyone is responsible for conserving it (Jaramillo, 2011). 
Before paramilitary forces assassinated him for defending the river and its people, Indigenous leader, Kimy 
Pernía Domicó, said, “sure, we said that Karagabí left this legacy, that he created water so everyone can use it 
... because otherwise, we Emberas would disappear, or be cursed by Karagabí for betraying his legacy (…)” 
                                            
1 The Embera Katios are an Indigenous people of  the Karib language family, originating in the Amazon region. When 
the Spanish invaded the Americas, they migrated following the Negro and Orinoco rivers down to the Caribbean coasts, 
and mainly settled in the Pacific region. The Embera Katio people of  the Upper Sinú, descendants of  a group of  the 
migrants, number about 3,200 and are located in 19 communities scattered along the Sinú (Keradó), Esmeralda 
(Kuranzadó), and Verde (Iwagadó) Rivers (Jaramillo, 2011). 
2 The Sinú basin starts at the Paramillo Knot (at 3960 m altitude). It covers an area of  1,207,000 hectares and is 415 
kilometers long, crossing south to north through the department of  Córdoba and emptying at the Mouth of  Tinajones, 
across from the Caribbean Sea (Roa-Avendaño, 2010). 
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(personal communication, 2010).3  
 
The Indigenous people defend their territory because they believe that their community’s survival depends on 
the life of  the river – damming and deviating the river’s water would mean death for the Embera-Katio 
culture. Their diet is based on the protein provided by the great abundance of  fish in the rivers and creeks of  
the Sinú basin, complemented by banana, manioc, and rice they grow on the floodplains. The new approach 
to controlling water – building the first Urrá dam and deviating the river – led to the end of  their fishing. 
Numerous species have disappeared. Further, their survival as a people is jeopardized as their livelihood and 
traditional knowledge about the river’s natural dynamics can no longer be applied and their cultural and 
economic meaning is being lost. 
 
For decades, the Indigenous people, together with peasant and fishing communities of  the lower basin, have 
been struggling against de-territorialization driven by this hydroelectric mega-project. Sometimes they were 
successful in court challenges; for example, the Constitutional Court, in its T-652 ruling in 1998, supported 
the Embera people’s rights, 
... constructing the civil works of  the Urrá I hydroelectric plant was more harmful for the cultural 
and economic life of  the Embera Katío people in the Upper Sinú valley, than the territorial pressure 
and lack of  recognition that they had been subjected to since the Spanish conquest: such works not 
only constitute another territorial pressure, but made it absolutely impossible for these people to 
continue their livelihoods of  hunting, gathering and itinerant crops, that enabled them to survive for 
centuries without degrading the fragile tropical rain forest environment that is their home  (cited in 
Baleta, 2006, p. 29). 
 
But such rulings did not diminish outside economic and political pressures for continuing large-scale 
infrastructure building. Hydropower plants are temples of  modernity, representing human progress in 
dominating nature (McCully, 2004). Leader Kimy Pernía never doubted that the ongoing hydroelectric project 
had the purpose of  drying the wetlands in the lower basin, to be taken over by the region’s wealthy cattle 
ranchers and agroindustrialists. To this respect, Alfredo Molano (cited in Roa-Avendaño, 2010) relates that 
these ranchers would do anything to dry up the Indigenous wetlands to expand their haciendas. He explains 
how, since the 1950s, politicians, businesspersons, and hacienda owners have dreamt of  plans to regulate 
water. In doing so, the irrigation districts and hydropower plants have created large societal confrontations. 
The words of  Kimy Pernía give us a glimpse into the far-reaching tragedy engulfing the lives of  Indigenous 
communities in the last few years:  
I learned about development about 20 years ago, when a priest named Betancur told us that, 
if  we didn’t accept the dam, we would go to hell. What development has meant for us has 
been to trample our rights, kill our fish, divide our community, and murder Lucindo 
Domicó. ... Development has flooded 28 of  our sacred places. (Pernía Domicó, 2011, p. 41) 
 
For centuries the Indigenous peoples of  the lower Sinú have had access to a thriving amphibian culture 
created by the natural flooding in the Lower Basin (Fals Borda, 2002). Despite this, politicians and 
environmental authorities in the region used “flood control” as their banner for social consensus behind 
building the dam. In July 2007, the lower Sinú basin was impacted by severe floods, demonstrating that 
controlling the river’s flow was more to dry up land for export-oriented enclaves than to curb flooding 
(Leguizamón, 2010). 
 
The Embera Katios have publicly denounced the way that public entities and officials have lied to the 
Indigenous people. The harshest criticism has been for the Minister of  Environment then in office. Pernía 
                                            
3 Interview with Kimy Pernía Domicó in Leguizamón. Kimy Pernía Domicó was one of  the most important Indigenous 
leaders of  the Embera Katío resistance against the Urra hydroelectric project. He was murdered on June 2, 2001, by the 
orders of  Carlos Castaño, a paramilitary leader, in Tierralta, Córdoba. He was killed and his body dismembered, then 
thrown into the Sinú River. 
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Domicó (2011) denounced, “first he authorized the pre-filling (of  the reservoir) without any consultation. 
Then he tried to fool our elder Nokos to get them to authorize filling the reservoir, agreeing to consult about 
it afterward. [...] Then, on the license, he ignored the entire proposal by the Embera Katío people” (p. 41). 
Further, a study by the Ministries of  Mines and Energy and the Environment to assess the Urrá project 
found large deficiencies in the project’s environmental impact study, for example, regarding water quality 
impacts throughout the basin and the negative effects that the salt wedge would have at the mouth of  the 
river (Pernía Domicó, 2011, p. 43). These are just a few of  the most serious impacts that both fishers and 
Indigenous people warned about before the project was built. The tragedy, one in a lengthy series, closely 
reflects the title of  a work by Colombian writer Gabriel García-Márquez – Chronicle of  a Death Foretold. 
 
Generating Water Scarcity and Conflict in the Territory of  Oyacachi, Ecuador 
 
A second illustration, apparently quite different but confronting a political process with very similar features, 
comes from Oyacachi, an Indigenous territory in the high Andean zone of northern Ecuador. Oyacachi is a 
community of Indigenous people of Cayambi origin who fled from the Highlands during the war of conquest 
by the Incas in the second half of the fifteenth century, took refuge, and made their livelihoods on the eastern 
slopes of snowcapped Mt. Cayambe (Ayala-Mora, 2008). Oyacachi, like many other Indigenous communities 
in Ecuador’s Highlands, achieved legal recognition as a “community” in 1939, after uprisings about land and 
the headway by the Indigenous movement in the early twentieth century. The community is inside the 
Cayambe-Coca National Park, located in a high-altitude Andean valley from 1,600 meters up to 4,300 meters. 
In the last 20 years, this community has lost its obscurity and become a national, even international, center of 
attention. 
 
This notoriety has several sources. On the one hand, scientists and conservationists are interested in the 
remarkable, unique biodiversity of these Andean forests and páramos (high-altitude moorlands), 
complemented by the scenic beauty, hot springs, and their distinctive handicrafts. However, the greatest 
interest focuses on the páramos in their territory, where many important water sources are located. This water 
is fundamental to local people, but it also has many other users, especially to the west, where it is used for 
human consumption, irrigation, energy, industry, and domestic use. 
 
One of the main water users is the capital city, Quito, with over two million inhabitants. Quito has tapped the 
water from the surrounding páramos since precolonial times, but in the last few decades the city’s rapid 
growth and unbridled demand for water have driven municipal authorities to seek and use ever-more-distant 
sources, which are very complex to manage (Swyngedouw, 2004). At this time, Quito is using water coming 
from the territory of its Metropolitan District, but also from other cantons in the province of Pichincha and 
even other provinces, such as Napo and Cotopaxi. This trend has reached the extreme with water from 
sources that naturally flow to the Amazon basin being transferred westward and tapped. 
 
The Metropolitan Public Water Supply and Sanitation Enterprise of Quito (EMAAP-Q) began one of its 
main projects to supply water to the capital in 1987, by applying to access water from the páramos in the 
National Park – an Ecological Reserve (a less restrictive category for human activities within the National 
Protected Areas System in Ecuador). Some páramos belonged to Oyacachi territory, so Quito formulated its 
major Papallacta Project, which was completed in 1990. The construction of phase two, called “Optimizing 
the Papallacta System,” was completed in 2002 and included the building of a dam with a storage capacity of 
12.5 MCM (million cubic meters) to meet 75 percent of the city’s demand (FONAG cited in FFLA, 2010). 
The project included the use of water from rivers that supply the Salvefaccha waterfall, which is important to 
the community of Oyacachi for both spiritual reasons (many of the community’s rituals and myths involve it) 
and ecological and economic practices (this zone oxygenates the water for their fish populations). 
 
At the same time, damming water sources with the Salvefaccha dam also affected other Indigenous 
communities, including inhabitants of the Cangahua zone, the driest and most eroded area on the western 
slopes of Mt. Cayambe. The 48 farming communities located there, organized under the Guanguilquí-
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Porotog Board (legalized in 1988), have a long background of fighting for their land and water rights. 
Guanguilquí-Porotog was granted a water concession in 1993 from the Salvefaccha and Tumiguina Rivers, 
but in 1995 the Water Enterprise applied for and obtained the same concessions. A rush for water 
concessions began, with EMAAP-Q racing against the Guanguilquí-Porotog Board and the community of 
Oyacachi. This race was encouraged by the National Water Resource Council (now called SENAGUA, 
National Water Secretary), the top government regulator governing water in Ecuador, which recommended 
applying for concessions before someone else got them.4  
 
This encroachment by a state project, in this case a powerful municipality, is reflected in the history of its 
planning and implementation. The community of Oyacachi only learned of the Salvefaccha dam construction 
in 1996 when the building company’s machinery moved into their territory. At the time, the community 
complained about the company trespassing on their Indigenous territory, but their indignation turned to 
protests and mobilizations that stopped the construction and obliged the Water Enterprise to sit down at the 
negotiation table. In compensation for the environmental and social damage, the community asked for a 
series of basic facilities for their village, such as water supply, sewerage, and access roads – the Enterprise 
only provided a water supply.  
 
Deviation of  Indigenous Community Water from the Colca River to the Pampas de Majes, Peru 
 
As in the Colombian and Ecuadorian cases, Peru’s recent history is replete with conflicts over land and water. 
In these clashes, the Indigenous peoples and rural communities are being deprived of  their territories and 
livelihoods by development policy that grants priority to “national progress by hydraulic mega-projects.” The 
Majes project is a prime example. 
 
The Colca River, the main tributary of  the Colca-Majes-Camaná basin that includes the Andes and part of  
the Arequipa Coast, is 300 km long. The upper part of  the basin has a damp, cold climate with an average 
annual precipitation of  630 mm. This zone is one of  the most important fresh water reserves for the 
Arequipa region. Raising alpaca is one of  this region’s most important small-farmer economic activities. The 
intermediate part of  the basin has a temperate climate, averaging 482 mm of  rainfall annually, concentrated in 
three months of  the year (January-March). This zone of  the Colca Valley is home to 6,000 families living in 
16 rural towns or communities. 
 
Residents of  these valley communities have farmed since long before the Incan empire.  Due to the scarcity 
of  rainfall, agriculture depends mainly on irrigation.  Ancestors living in this area gained nearly 12,000 
hectares of  farmland by building terraces and irrigation systems that are still being used today. However, 
consecutive policies of  marginalization over the years have prevented maintenance of  the irrigation 
infrastructure; therefore, two thirds of  the terraces are no longer irrigated (Denevan, 1986). Farmers from 
several communities must irrigate their crops every 70 to 90 days, and, in each community in the Colca Valley, 
all the productive, social, cultural, and political activities revolve around water. Their cultural identity is based 
on water, so the water authorities, irrigation organization, rituals, traditions, and norms for water management 
play a preponderant role in community dynamics. 
 
The lower Colca-Majes-Camaná basin has a dry, tropical climate. On the desert plains of  Majes and Siguas in 
this zone, there is practically no rain. Here the Pampas are “cut” in a U shape by the Colca River (also called 
the Majes River and then the Camaná River along its way toward the ocean) and the Siguas River, forming 
narrow inter-coastal valleys (100-1,000 meters wide), where agriculture is highly productive, due to the fertility 
of  their alluvial soil. 
 
For decades politicians and engineers in Arequipa have dreamed of  progress and development based on 
highly modern agriculture by irrigating 22,000 hectares of  the desert Pampas of  Majes flower (and 
                                            
4 Personal communication, Cristóbal Ascanta, President of Oyacachi local government, February 1, 2011. 
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subsequently 34,000 hectares in the Pampas of  Siguas), but they have lacked the resources (water and 
funding) to make this project possible. In 1946, pre-feasibility studies proposed to store and transfer the water 
of  the Colca River in the upper basin. In 1971, with support from the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and other international banks, the government offered all its support to commence this 
project. The Majes Consortium (MACON), comprising international companies from Switzerland, England, 
Spain, Canada, and South Africa, was to handle all the Majes Irrigation Project (PIM) construction, beginning 
in 1972. MACON used the latest cutting-edge technology (laser beams) for the water transfer, at an 
exorbitant cost (US$1.32 billion, part of  the foreign debt), so the investment was US$88,000 per hectare – 
extremely high for anywhere in the world – bearing in mind that by 2007 the PIM had made 15,000 hectares 
usable for agriculture. The average cost to make a hectare of  land usable for agriculture in other irrigation 
projects on the coast was US $6,500 (Vera, 2011a, 2011b; Vera & Zwarteveen, 2008). 
 
An amazing feature of  the PIM is that it failed to consider the rural Indigenous communities of  the Colca 
Valley as direct project beneficiaries, although their water needs were urgent when the project feasibility 
studies were being prepared. On the contrary, the water sources of  almost half  the communities were 
seriously affected (dried up) by construction of  the PIM’s hydraulic infrastructure. Villagers have had to fight 
for many years to be considered beneficiaries. Ironically, up to 2009, the Peruvian government had invested 
only US$311 per hectare (0.35% of  PIM spending) to improve and rehabilitate the irrigation infrastructure 
for the 6,000 farmers in the Colca Valley (ATDR, 2006). 
 
In 1983, MACON finished building the hydraulic infrastructure and the transfer of  water began that same 
year. That infrastructure included, among other facilities, the Condoroma dam, a mega-dam constructed right 
on the river at 4,158 meters altitude, with the capacity to dam up 285 MCM. From this dam, water is released 
(through a regulated flow of  some 8 m3/sec) into the Colca River, and the flow is dammed 70 km downriver 
again at the dam-intake of  Tuti,5 where another approximately 276 MMC of  water joins it from the upper-
middle part of  the Colca-Majes-Camaná basin. At Tuti, the river’s full flow is deviated and transferred to 
another river, the Siguas River, through a canal 100 km long (of  which 88 km are tunnels) crossing the rocky 
Andes running along the whole left edge of  the Colca Valley. Deviating the entire flow of  the river, the 
project affects the fish population (the population’s main food source) downriver and the watershed runs the 
risk of  drying up (at least during the nine months of  no rain), since only little creeks run crosswise into the 
valley. Several Indigenous communities had to forget their dreams of  getting irrigation water from the Colca 
River downstream from the Tuti intake. The PIM canal has the capacity to conduct up to 34 m3/sec of  water. 
Current flow through the canal is 10 to 15 m3/sec. It is planned to use the canal’s full capacity when the 
Majes II Project is built, leading all the water downstream to the land of  the agro-export industries and 
wealthier agri-biz farms. 
 
From 2004 to 2008 the government implemented the Program to Formalize Water Use Rights 
(PROFODUA),6 also with support from international banks, to register (legalize) water use rights with public 
registers on an individual and block level (the term “collective right” was avoided). PROFODUA has basically 
formalized water rights for irrigation users on the coast; funds ran out when they began to work in the Andes. 
By 2007 PROFODUA had granted 278,119 users water rights, of  which 78 percent were males (Guerrero, 
2007). In the case of  PIM, PROFODUA formalized the usage rights for 2,587 users, recognizing the water 
volume being used at the time. In short, this means that 560 MMC of  water are legally registered for the PIM. 
                                            
5 Tuti is one of  the first communities in the mid-high basin where agricultural activities begin. Upstream only livestock 
and fishing activities are possible. 
6 PROFODUA is a program implemented to meet the requirements for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Peru 
and the United States. This “formalization”, although not explicitly set forth in the legal wording, includes (among other 
administrative procedures) public registration of  usage rights to certain volumes of  water. Such rights may be traded or 
exchanged by their holders, which, in practice, means a water rights market. The program is totally implemented with 
public and international (IDB) funding by ATDR (now ALA) technicians and supervised by the Intendence of  Water 
Resources of  INRENA. 
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Other users, such as rural Indigenous communities in the Colca Valley, can no longer access the water that is 
dammed up in Tuti. On the contrary, they are accused of  affecting the river’s ecological flow, since one of  the 
towns ventured to build – with their own efforts – an intake and canal to use the remaining water of  the 
Colca, downstream from the Tuti dam. 
 
Defending Territory and Water: Responses by Indigenous Population Groups 
 
Amidst seriously unequal power structures, combining class-based subordination with racism grounded in 
notions of  Western-modern superiority versus Indigenous inferiority, Indigenous peoples and rural 
Indigenous communities have not been silent victims of  this capitalist usurpation and accumulation. Under 
complex conditions, they pursue their strategies of  resistance and defense, openly and undercover. This 
resistance, however, as the cases show, takes place under extremely difficult circumstances and in contexts of  
outright plunder, often including tragic and violent loss of  lives.   
 
The Embera Katio people in Colombia, for example, have had to struggle for self-defense in a dramatically 
militarized, violent context. Over 20 of  their leaders have been assassinated, and others have disappeared or 
been displaced.7 Their fight became public with the Dowabura,8 in November 1994, navigating down the Sinú 
River. Approximately 700 Embera Katío Indigenous started off  on rafts from the high Andean forest 
headwaters of  the river and continued down to Lorica, Córdoba, near the Caribbean Sea, to make the impacts 
that the dam would have on their territory visible. Subsequently, they occupied the Embassy of  Sweden, 
where they signed an agreement to be compensated for the damage caused by the hydropower for flooding 
their territory.9 Non-compliance with these agreements led them, in December 1999, to peacefully occupy the 
offices of  the Ministry of  Environment, in Bogotá, after a 700-kilometer march by 700 Indigenous. When 
they were ousted and repressed, they took over the Ministry’s gardens, with support from the fishers of  the 
Lower Basin. This sit-in lasted until an agreement was reached with the company after several months; the 
agreement, however, was never fully kept. This political mobilization was supported by, and coordinated with, 
other Indigenous actions, such as the U'wa people versus the petroleum industry. 
 
Political action by the Embera Katio people achieved a major national and international impact. The 
Indigenous leaders made several tours around the country and visited the countries that economically 
supported the project to demand that the work be suspended. They have also used intense legal mobilization, 
with support from various scholars and attorneys. In over 15 years, the Embera Katio people have 
coordinated different strategies to defend their territory, including social mobilization and political and legal 
actions; however, the core of  their struggle has been cultural resistance. The Embera Katio decided that the 
water origin myth should become the force mobilizing their people to face the threats to their territory. Like 
the great tree, Jenené, the Emberas should feed and hold fast to their roots: territory, organization, nature, 
and culture. “This bridge based on cultural roots and worldviews, to analyze the problems of  the Embera 
Katio people of  Karagabí, enabled to established strong communication among the leaders and their 
communities” (Jaramillo, 2011, p. 59). At this time, resistance by the Indigenous and fishers aims to prevent 
progress with the project’s second phase: construction of  the Urrá II hydroelectric plant. 
 
Likewise, in the case of  Oyacachi, Ecuador, since 1998 there have been community struggles using several 
defense strategies, including the judiciary. In 1998, the community of  Oyacachi obtained water concessions to 
seven mineral water springs and 18 hot springs located in the micro-watershed of  the Cunuyacu River. That 
same year, EMAAP-Q realized that those concessions were in the zone where the Salvefaccha dam was to be 
                                            
7 The rich Embera Katio territory has been disputed by guerrilla and paramilitary groups because of  its geo-strategic 
location. The Paramillo Natural National Park that coincides with the Indigenous territory makes it possible to control 
exit routes from the interior toward the Gulf  of  Uraba and of  Morrosquillo in the Caribbean, and traffic between the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. 
8 “Dowabura” in the Embera language means “saying farewell to the river.” 
9 The flooding affected more than 7,000 hectares and displaced about 130 Embera Katio families. 
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built in the future. By holding protests and marches the Indigenous community forced the state to renegotiate 
and redesign the intervention. The recognition of  water concession ownership was one of  the reasons the 
company finally decided to compensate the community for the damage caused.  In 2001, an economic 
indemnity of  approximately US$65,000 was agreed upon as an initial sum, with annual payments to be made 
for 47 years starting the first year of  operation. 
 
Outside intervention could also be confronted by reaching an agreement with the Ministry of Environment 
under which the territory of Oyacachi was expanded, whereby both parties would examine, analyze, and 
approve or reject any project in which third parties, including local, provincial, regional, and national 
government entities, wanted to use or extract natural and cultural resources from the area. With the public 
deed and agreement with the Ministry of Environment, Oyacachi made its claim to EMAAP-Q, justifying the 
ownership of 44,500 hectares (11% of the National Park) (Lasso, 2011). Further, they complained to the 
Ministry of Environment for having left them alone in this situation. Unfortunately, the dispute over these 
water resources has made relations between the Indigenous communities of Cangahua (Guanguilquí-Porotog 
Board) and Oyacachi, once based on marriage alliances, barter, and other exchange arrangements, 
antagonistic. This conflict has worsened with the intervention by EMAAP-Q. The Guanguilquí-Porotog 
Board receives 250 l/s of water from the Salvefaccha dam to continue with the canal project (mainly for 
irrigation, but also for domestic use), while people of Oyacachi feel they have been shortchanged and, sooner 
or later, the water supply for a growing community with large-scale tourism projects will be insufficient. 
 
In the Colca Valley in Peru, Indigenous peasants have also reacted in different ways to the Majes Irrigation 
Project. Local folk initially collaborated with the MACON Company with the understanding that the PIM 
was going to provide water to satisfy their irrigation needs. They provided labor and their draft animals to 
haul construction material, food, housing, and water to mix tons of  cement. They even let the company 
destroy their terraces of  crops to construct (temporary) roads and dry up local water sources to open up the 
canals and tunnels. However, they found, to their great surprise and disappointment, that the project had 
excluded them. 
 
In 1975 Canocota, a town located near the dam-intake of  Tuti, reacted by demanding that PIM construct a 
new bridge because the only bridge existing at the location, one that was made by the communities 
themselves, was being used by heavy equipment to transport construction materials and it soon started to 
collapse. Then Cabanaconde, a town located almost at the end of  Colca Valley, began holding peaceful 
protests, at first calling on the government to include them as beneficiaries. However, after being ignored and 
urgently needing water, they were forced to dynamite a stretch of  the imposing Majes canal in 1983. 
Following this act, their leaders were imprisoned and the townspeople were accused of  being terrorists, very 
dangerous accusations in those years when the Shining Path was up in arms (see Gelles, 2002, 2012). 
However, after a series of  negotiations, several water valves were installed to provide a total of  350 l/s of  
water. Following this action, eight towns on the left side of  the Valley were encouraged to join together and 
demand that the government open up more water valves for their communities also. Their claims were 
disregarded. Officials refused to attend the public meetings, listen to the complaints, or allow community 
committee members at the negotiation table. Indigenous women representatives of  the committee decided to 
bring the government authority on board by force. They dragged off  the top government representative (sub-
prefect) and dunked him completely in the water tank of  the main fountain of  Chivay, capital of  the province 
of  Caylloma. They purposely created the metaphor of  drowning the official in water that was “stolen” from 
them.  They wanted the authorities and politicians to understand that they were ready to do anything in order 
to get back the water that had dried up (see Vera, 2011a). Finally, the eight towns got their hearing, but the 
allocated water did not cover the local irrigation needs. Communities, such as Pinchollo, were forced to 
illegally make their own valves to access canal water (in 2005). They are currently being punished by the 
government and have to pay a fine for breaking the state water law. 
 
The community of  Coporaque has also responded by building an intake and canal seven kilometers 
downriver from the Tuti intake to satisfy their irrigation needs and demanding their rights to use the water 
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from the Colca River. Initially, four towns on the right side joined together to negotiate with the PIM 
management, asking them to let some water run downstream and conduct it to a multi-community canal in a 
future project. When the PIM authorities refused and the government displayed apathy, the four towns 
desisted; only Coporaque persisted with the project and managed to build a canal. With tremendous work and 
25 years of  struggle, they now have access to 280 l/s of  water, but this canal is used only at one third or 
sometimes half  its capacity because there is no water in the river. The town of  Coporaque has not yet given 
up.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The variety of Indigenous peoples and rural communities in the Andean countries with their own repertoires, 
symbols, normative meanings, and substantial local economies represent specific historical and cultural 
arrangements in the collective management of natural resources in particular territories. However, this does 
not lend itself to romantization or folklorization. In this age of neoliberal globalization, the political, 
economic, cultural, and ecological dynamics interact with local Indigenous systems in the management of 
water and demand for innovative solutions to problems in the constantly changing situations. 
 
This paper has analyzed how economically and politically powerful agents, such as national governments and 
multinational companies interested in large-scale water development projects, have intervened in, 
undermined, and “disembedded” the water uses and rights of Indigenous communities, profoundly 
challenging the integrity of their territorial livelihoods. Water territories and water management collectives of  
the Embera Katio people in Colombia, the Oyacachi community in Ecuador, and the Colca Valley Indigenous 
peasant communities in Peru have been confronted with fierce encroachment practices. This often takes place 
under the banner of  “participatory policies” and “multicultural recognition” – which are explicit components 
of  the legislative frameworks in all three countries. Similarly, in all the countries the official policy discourses 
strongly defend these projects in the name of  progress, modernization, and development. Hence, the politics 
of  the co-optation of  local communities and factions is an important ingredient. The dramatic and increasing 
influences of  globalizing neoliberalism clearly show that national and international government or market-
based policies do not attempt to adapt to local contexts – as the participatory discourses advocate – rather, 
they seek to transform and control these locally particular territorial spaces. There is an ongoing and 
intensively growing effort to reorient the geopolitical configuration and make waterscapes and territories 
serve the demands of  the world market (Barkin, 2009; McCully, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004). 
 
Such external encroachment and control projects, however, require more than enacting new laws and policies. 
A new water-political order becomes institutionalized in local societies only when it becomes integrated 
within its economic, moral, and ideological structure. Laws cannot act; only societal forces can shape such 
change. Water user collectives, peasant communities, and Indigenous peoples in Andean countries often 
manage to resist externally-imposed policies that attempt to impose “normalization” and take control of  
water rights and management systems. Their resistance in the water domain includes opposing distributive 
inequalities of  the benefits and burdens of  water access and development,  resisting non-democratic forms 
of  representation, and challenging the rules of  the game and the politics of  water, territory, and identity 
themselves. Indeed, since power games in the Andean water control arenas show the intimate links between 
socio-economic exploitation and cultural-symbolic subordination (being distinct, but intertwined, in multi-
stranded ways), the struggles for alternatives also dynamically combine strategies and claims for economic 
redistribution, on the one hand, and cultural justice, political representation, and democracy, on the other. 
Many peasant and Indigenous water user collectives and federations gain political effectiveness by combining 
class and identity struggles. Their struggles to re-appropriate or defend their water sources simultaneously 
seek to decolonize the modernist water cultures and defy the individualistic, profit-maximizing, or state-
dependent user identities they were assigned (Boelens, 2009).  
 
As the cases from Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador have made clear, Indigenous peoples contest the 
undermining and subordination of  their water and territorial rights through a myriad of  multi-scalar 
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livelihood defense strategies. This harsh, extremely difficult, unequal fight necessarily involves strategic 
choices and changes, in their productive, technological, and ecological foundations, as well as their cultural, 
political, and normative institutions. Thus, by defending their water and territorial rights systems, they 
simultaneously re-create and re-shape them. In the end, resistance to modernist water reforms, neo-colonial 
normalization, and neoliberal market-led encroachment is both about securing access to water and other 
inseparable socio-natural territorial components and continuing to exist as territory-based political and 
cultural communities. In this respect, the challenges that Indigenous peoples in the Andean countries face are 
enormous and mounting daily.  
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